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Abstract 
Conventional wisdom is that some capital flows are inherently more volatile than 
others. However, our investigation of the statistical properties of these flows shows 
that no regular relationships exist to suggest that the particular composition of 
capital flows can help to explain the overall stability of the external accounts. 
Instead, capital seems to come and go in different forms with few reliable patterns.  
We show that while industrialised economies have experienced a trend rise in the 
volatility of individual components in the capital account, this variability is largely 
offsetting. Such offsetting relationships appear less prevalent in emerging 
economies.  
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 VOLATILITY IN INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOVEMENTS 
Chris Becker and Clare Noone 
1.  Introduction 
Over the past decade or so, domestic financial markets have grown rapidly and a 
greater proportion of financial capital has come to be traded across international 
borders. Following a period of relatively steady expansion in line with world 
output growth in the 1980s and early 1990s, gross international capital flows began 
to grow more rapidly in the mid 1990s (Figure 1). It is also evident that there have 
been major fluctuations around an upward trend in gross capital flows and that at 
times there were noticeable compositional shifts in the importance of various types 
of flows.1 
Figure 1: Gross International Capital Flows 
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1  Battellino (2006) provides a more detailed exposition of these trends. Although not part of our 
detailed analysis, we also note the dramatic decline in gross flows in the recent financial 
crisis. 2 
While these trends have generally been viewed as a sign of economic and financial 
development, the merits of financial globalisation and integration have attracted an 
increasing amount of scrutiny. Financial crises, particularly in the 1990s, have 
given rise to a body of literature which calls into question the unqualified benefits 
of international integration (Krugman 2000, Calvo and Reinhart 2000 and 
Kose et al 2006). One focus has been on the possible disadvantages faced by 
emerging economies that open up to global capital markets prematurely.2 
With some types of flows typically seen to be inherently more susceptible to 
sudden reversals, the composition of the overall capital account has also received 
considerable attention. The conventional wisdom is that certain types of capital 
flows are more volatile than others and thus potentially destabilising (Classens, 
Dooley and Warner 1995; Becker and Noone 2008). In particular, portfolio or bank 
and money market flows are often seen as being speculative and subject to sharp 
reversals, thereby exposing recipient countries to the whims of international 
financiers. These flows are correspondingly often described as being ‘hot’. In 
contrast, flows such as foreign direct investment, which are seen to engender a 
longer-term commitment determined by fundamental developments, have come to 
be viewed as being relatively stable and unlikely to reverse without good reason. 
This perceived lack of ‘skittishness’ has seen such flows labelled as being ‘cold’.  
This paper examines whether different types of capital flows have attributes that 
make them more or less likely to contribute to volatility in the overall capital 
account. We examine the statistical properties of the flows to judge whether they 
are regularly ‘hot’ or ‘cold’. For the purpose of this paper we leave aside the 
question of whether some forms of capital confer other desirable economic effects 
on the recipient country, such as the technological and managerial transfer often 
                                           
2 For a literature survey, see Obstfeld and Taylor  (2003). For related discussions on the 
disadvantages faced by emerging economies, possible transitional arrangements, and 
prerequisites required to gain from trade in capital, see Nakagawa and Psalida (2007) and 
Kose et al (2006). If capital flows are completely determined by domestic variables such as 
economic growth and the expected return on assets, they would be of little direct policy 
interest. Instead, the underlying source of any weakness would attract the attention. On the 
other hand, if capital flows are not uniquely determined (that is, subject to bouts of excessive 
optimism and crises of confidence) and are influenced by variables in international capital 
markets that lie beyond the control of domestic policy-makers, they may warrant more direct 
scrutiny (Krugman 2000; Radelet and Sachs 2000). 
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associated with direct investment. And since we are interested in assessing the 
overall volatility of the capital account, we largely focus on net flows while 
acknowledging that gross flows play a crucial role in understanding the underlying 
sources of variability.3 Throughout, we compare and contrast the experience of six 
industrialised economies with that of six emerging economies. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 defines our concept 
of volatility and examines a number of measures to test the validity of commonly 
held priors. Section 3 provides several insights into how capital flows interact 
within the capital account of a country and with the flows of other countries. 
Section 4 provides empirical estimates of possible explanations for capital account 
volatility. The final Section provides some concluding remarks, while Appendix A 
applies a series of simple econometric techniques to the question at hand. 
2.  Variability of the Capital Account 
There are several ways of measuring the variability of the capital account and its 
components. We take our lead from Classens et al (1995) who employ a number of 
simple statistical techniques to test whether some types of capital flows can be 
reliably identified as being inherently more volatile than others. Contrary to the 
commonly held view, their findings suggest that the composition of capital flows is 
endogenously determined by domestic factors and that little can be learned from 
looking at individual flows in isolation when the source of instability tends to be 
aggregate shocks to the determinants of the capital account. Our work is somewhat 
different in the way it measures volatility and offers some explanations for why 
industrialised and emerging economies have different experiences when it comes 
to capital flows. 
Throughout the paper we use standard balance of payments data sourced from the 
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS), on a 
                                           
3 Debelle and Galati (2005) point out that knowledge of whether foreigners or domestic 
residents are driving the flows is useful. There is some evidence that in contrast to 
industrialised economies, emerging economies’ net capital flows are usually driven in large 
part by non-residents (Lowe 2009). This may expose emerging economies to sudden turns in 
the sentiment of foreign investors (see also Calvo 2000). 
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quarterly basis. Except where explicitly stated, the data are then converted into 
local currency terms and scaled by nominal GDP (for details see Appendix B) for 
analysis. The balance of payments identity imposes the constraint that the current 
account balance (CAB) is equal to the capital account balance (KAB), and the two 
concepts can be used more or less interchangeably. The capital account refers to 
what has become more conventionally termed the financial account and consists of 
foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio equity (PFE), portfolio debt (PFD), bank 
and money market (BMM)4, and official reserve (RES) flows. We use this 
disaggregation of the data for the remainder of the paper. Our sample of six 
industrialised economies comprises the United States, Japan, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, Australia and Sweden. The six emerging economies for which 
data are readily available are South  Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Brazil, 
Mexico and Argentina. In the interest of brevity we present most results in terms of 
the simple unweighted average for industrialised and emerging economies. Where 
interesting results are apparent on a by-country basis these are discussed in their 
own right. The sample period spans the first quarter of 1980 to the fourth quarter of 
2005, inclusively. 
2.1  Volatility of Capital Flows 
We measure the volatility of flows as the standard deviation of the ratio of the 
flows to GDP. Scaling by GDP is important because we are most interested in 
large swings in the flows from each country’s perspective. To capture how 
volatility among the flows has evolved over time we calculate the standard 
deviations of quarterly data over a one-year rolling window for each country. For 
expositional purposes we average the results across emerging economies and 
across industrialised economies as depicted in Figure 2. 
The overall volatility of the capital account in emerging economies has generally 
been around double that experienced by industrialised economies. Furthermore, 
emerging economies have more discrete episodes when volatility rises markedly, 
in part reflecting the fact that they have more frequent balance of payments crises.  
                                           
4  In the balance of payments these flows appear under the category of ‘other’. As bank loans 
and money market transactions are the main components of this category, we refer to these 
flows as ‘bank and money market’ flows to lend them a more meaningful label. 
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Notes:  Volatility of capital flows is measured as the simple average of the standard deviation in the ratio of 
capital flows to GDP over a quarterly 1-year rolling window. Industrialised economies are United States, 
Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, Australia and Sweden, and the emerging economies are 
South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. 
Sources:  ABS; Bloomberg; CEIC; IMF; Thomson Reuters; authors’ calculations  
These outcomes are in line with what we know about emerging economies. More 
insights are to be found in the developments in the volatility of the different types 
of flows, and the contrast between the experiences of emerging and industrialised 
economies. 
One of the most noteworthy findings is that while there has been little change in 
the average degree of volatility observed in total flows, the pattern of volatility has 
evolved very differently among the various components of the capital account. In 
industrialised economies, the component flows are generally more volatile than the 
total and have virtually all exhibited a trend rise in volatility. Given no such trend 
in the volatility of the overall capital account, there must be a degree of negative 
correlation between various components. Indeed, there is a sizeable negative 
correlation between portfolio debt and bank and money market flows. This 
suggests a degree of substitutability between different forms of capital that allows 
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industrialised economies to accommodate variability in the mix of different types 
of capital flows without significant adverse consequences for overall flows.5  
Another interesting feature of the data for industrialised economies is the sharp 
movement in the volatility of foreign direct investment and portfolio equity 
investment flows earlier this decade. This principally reflects the increase in 
mergers and acquisitions among European countries, which was financed through 
stock swaps. Under these deals, direct investment is financed by exchanging stocks 
between companies. This results in offsetting portfolio equity and foreign direct 
investment flows, with little if any effect on the overall capital account.6 
Among emerging economies, the trend rise in the standard deviation of the 
constituent flows is less pronounced, and the constituent flows within the capital 
account are often less volatile than the total. Importantly, this suggests not only 
that the substitutability between the flows evident in industrialised economies may 
not be present in emerging economies but also that at least some flows tend to 
move in the same direction. The volatility of bank and money market flows is 
relatively high for emerging economies, in which there is typically also a greater 
reliance on bank-intermediated finance and local currency debt markets remain 
relatively underdeveloped. 
The behaviour of reserve flows is quite different for emerging and industrialised 
economies. Not surprisingly, reserves are considerably more volatile among the 
emerging economies where monetary authorities are typically more active in 
foreign exchange markets. With the exceptions of the Plaza Accord and the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis, the less activist role of central banks 
among industrialised economies, with their typically floating exchange rates, 
results in reserve flows that are, on average, less than half as volatile as those of 
emerging economies. Japan is an obvious exception to this, with a jump in 
volatility in 2003–2004. 
                                           
5  Levchenko and Mauro (2007) also find that while the overall capital account of emerging 
economies is more volatile than that of industrialised economies, portfolio flows of 
industrialised economies are two to five times more volatile than those of emerging 
economies. 
6  The merger of Vodafone Plc in the United Kingdom with Mannesmann AG in Germany is a 
prominent example of this phenomenon. For more details see Becker (2003). 
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2.2  Persistence of Capital Flows 
A complementary measure of the stability of capital flows is their degree of 
persistence over time. ‘Cold’ flows that are perceived to be relatively stable should 
also display evidence of strong positive correlation with their own past values. To 
assess persistence we calculate autocorrelation coefficients for each flow in each 
country over the sample. The data are quarterly ratios of flows to GDP and the 
correlations are calculated for 16 lags (Figures 3 and 4). 
Total capital flows are found to exhibit a high degree of persistence in most 
industrialised economies. The autocorrelation coefficients are typically large, 
positive, and gradually decay as the lags increase. This suggests that there is a high 
degree of persistence in the overall capital account for at least one to two years.7 
The capital account in emerging economies is typically less autocorrelated and 
only two of the emerging economies examined have autocorrelation coefficients of 
greater than two-thirds for four or more lags, compared to five out of the six 
industrialised economies. 
The autocorrelation coefficients for the components of the capital account suggest 
that these flows generally display little if any persistence for industrialised 
economies. The coefficients are small and change sign frequently. There are, 
however, a number of notable exceptions. For the United  States we find that 
portfolio debt flows are highly persistent. This is not surprising given that the 
United States is home to the largest debt markets and the US dollar is the world’s 
main reserve currency. Japanese foreign direct investment flows are also shown to 
be highly persistent. This may reflect the structural ‘hollowing out’ of Japanese 
manufacturing as Japanese companies undertook direct investment to set up plants 
in other Asian countries where labour costs were lower. 
                                           
7  Further evidence of this persistence is presented when we investigate the forecastability of the 
flows in Appendix A. For more persistent flows, the expected future value will be closer to 
the current value of that flow. There is some evidence to suggest that for industrialised 
economies the current account is endogenous to domestic economic fundamentals such as 
growth, saving and investment, and that current account deficits do not by themselves 
precipitate sudden stops that cause adjustment in other variables (Debelle and Galati 2005). 
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Other than these exceptions, there is no evidence among industrialised economies 
to support the view that some types of capital flow are inherently more persistent 
than others. Foreign direct investment is typically not as persistent as might have 
been expected and can hardly be distinguished from the bank and money market or 
portfolio flows, which are often thought of as being relatively temporary. 
The evidence is somewhat different for emerging economies. Foreign direct 
investment flows are relatively persistent for a number of these economies. This 
can probably be attributed to emerging economies being natural destinations for 
such investments, with inflows typically dominating this category.8 There are also 
several other examples of persistence for some components of the capital account, 
but there are no consistent patterns across emerging economies. 
 
                                           
8 In contrast, for industrialised economies foreign direct investment typically flows in both 
directions. 
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Figure 3: Autocorrelation Coefficients – Industrialised Economies  
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Figure 4: Autocorrelation Coefficients – Emerging Economies  
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2.3  Composition of Cross-border Finance 
Policy-makers may be interested in understanding how capital account volatility is 
related to the composition of cross-border flows. More specifically, as a flow 
assumes a more prominent share in the capital account, a systematic relationship 
between its volatility and that of the total may be discernible. If some flows are 
inherently more or less stable, then as these flows become more important as a 
source of cross-border financing we should be able to observe whether or not this 
exerts an influence on the overall capital account. 
To test whether such statistical regularities are observable we disaggregate the 
quarterly country data by type of flow, as defined earlier. We then calculate the 
importance of each type of capital flow in the overall capital account. The 
importance of each type of flow in a particular economy’s capital account is 
calculated as the ratio of the absolute value of the net flow to the sum of the 
absolute value of all flows in the capital account.9 This is done over five-year 
blocks from 1981 to 2005. The changing importance of each flow for every 
country is measured as the difference in this ratio from one five-year block to the 
next. A positive number indicates that a flow has become more important in the 
overall capital account of the country in question. 
To measure the variability of total net capital flows, we first scale the quarterly 
capital account balance for each country by GDP and then calculate the standard 
deviation of the data over the same five-year blocks (Table 1). Our gauge of how 
the variability of the capital account has changed is then given by the difference in 
the standard deviations from one five-year block to the next. 
                                           
9 We take the absolute value of the quarterly flows and the capital account to avoid the 
problems of interpretation associated with either the numerator or denominator switching 
sign. 
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Table 1: The Volatility of Capital Account Flows 
Standard deviation in the quarterly ratio of the capital account to GDP 
  1981–1985 1986–1990 1991–1995 1996–2000 2001–2005 
US  1.3 0.9 0.9 1.1 0.8 
Japan  1.5 1.1 0.5 0.6 0.7 
Germany  1.7 1.0 0.6 0.9 2.1 
UK  1.4 2.0 1.0 1.2 1.0 
Australia  1.0 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.7 
Sweden  2.0 1.4 2.1 0.8 2.0 
       
Korea  2.7 3.6 1.5 5.7 1.5 
Thailand  2.8 4.8 3.2 8.6 4.4 
Philippines  3.7 3.5 2.7 3.6 3.7 
Brazil  3.6 1.9 1.7 1.2 2.5 
Mexico  3.8 2.4 2.3 1.3 1.0 
Argentina  1.7 3.0 1.8 1.3 4.2 
Source:   authors’ calculations 
 
Figure 5 plots the relationship between changes in the importance of each of the 
flows and capital account volatility for industrialised and emerging economies. The 
changing importance of the flows lies along the vertical axis and the changing 
volatility in the capital account on the horizontal axis.  
A positive relationship in the scatter plots would be consistent with more volatile 
flows becoming more important, thereby raising the average volatility of the 
capital account. Conversely, a negative relationship would be consistent with less 
volatile flows becoming more important. 
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Few statistically significant relationships emerge when regression lines are fitted to 
the data (not shown). For industrialised economies there is a statistically significant 
positive relationship between the increasing importance of reserve flows and 
increasing capital account volatility. For emerging economies the increasing 
importance of portfolio equity flows tend to be associated with decreasing capital 
account volatility, contrary to the conventional wisdom.10 
In addition, a number of specific cases can be cited that are clearly at odds with the 
conventional wisdom. For example, in Australia from the 1980s to the 1990s there 
was a rise in the importance of foreign direct investment and a decline in the 
importance of bank and money market flows. While preconceived ideas about the 
former being cold and the latter being hot flows would imply lower variability in 
overall capital inflows, the opposite occurred (refer also to Table 1). Similarly, at 
the same time, the United States experienced a decline in the importance of foreign 
direct investment at the expense of bank and money market flows, but, on average, 
volatility of overall flows declined. 
What is evident from Figure 5 is that for industrialised economies the observations 
are clustered in an ellipse around the vertical axis. This implies that the 
composition of finance changed noticeably over time, but the capital account 
remained relatively stable. The observations for emerging economies are more 
widely dispersed and spread out along the horizontal axis, indicating that overall 
capital account volatility changed more noticeably over time. Overall, these results 
suggest that volatility of the capital account is not systematically related to its 
composition. 
                                           
10 Comparing the composition of the capital account to its overall volatility in levels, rather than 
changes, also fails to reveal any compelling patterns. Although we find that a high share of 
portfolio debt flows tends to be associated with relatively low capital account volatility for 
industrialised economies, the reverse is true for emerging economies. We also find that high 
capital account volatility is associated with a high share of bank and money market flows for 
emerging economies, but not for industrialised countries. Note that this analysis does not 
account for possible unobserved country fixed effects. 
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3.  Interactions Between Flows 
The results in the preceding Sections suggest that the co-movement of different 
types of capital flows seems to be central to understanding the overall variability of 
the capital account.  
To provide a more comprehensive view of the data and how the flows interact we 
estimate cross-correlation coefficients for all capital flows. Importantly, we 
distinguish between how different types of flows are correlated ‘within’ each 
country’s capital account and with the flows of ‘other’ countries. The quarterly 
data are summed to annual totals (and expressed as a ratio to GDP) for this 
purpose, thereby shifting focus away from high-frequency changes in the flows. 
3.1  Within Capital Account Correlations 
Table 2 summarises within country cross-correlation results by showing the 
average of the correlation coefficients across industrialised economies and across 
emerging economies. It also shows, in brackets, the number of countries with 
negative correlation coefficients for a given pairing of capital account flows. 
Correlations between various types of flows within each country’s capital account 
are generally negative. For industrialised economies, around 75 per cent of the 
flows are negatively correlated within their own capital account. For emerging 
economies the degree of negative correlation is smaller at 47 per cent. 
For industrialised economies, on average there is a sizeable negative correlation 
between foreign direct investment and portfolio equity flows. Bank and money 
market and portfolio debt flows also show a negative correlation on average for 
industrialised economies. 
There is a strong positive correlation between portfolio debt flows and the capital 
account for both industrialised and emerging economies. This positive relationship 
is particularly strong for Australia, Japan and the United States. For emerging 
economies, the capital account is also always positively correlated with bank and 
money market flows, and typically more so than for industrialised economies. This 
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strong link is consistent with a greater degree of bank dependence among emerging 
economies. 
Table 2: Within Country Capital Account Correlations 
Average of coefficients for each country calculated on annual values as a ratio to 















Industrialised economies         
Foreign direct investment  1.0           
Portfolio equity investment  –0.3 (4)  1.0         
Portfolio debt investment  0.0 (4)  –0.3 (5) 1.0       
Bank and money markets  –0.2 (5)  –0.2 (4) –0.3 (5) 1.0     
Reserves  0.0 (2)  –0.1 (5) 0.0 (3) –0.2 (4) 1.0   
Capital account  0.1 (1)  0.0 (2) 0.5 (0) 0.2 (1) 0.1 (2)  1.0 
         
Emerging economies         
Foreign direct investment  1.0           
Portfolio equity investment  0.0 (3)  1.0         
Portfolio debt investment  –0.2 (3)  0.3 (1) 1.0       
Bank and money markets  –0.2 (4)  –0.1 (5) 0.1 (1) 1.0     
Reserves  –0.2 (6)  –0.3 (5) –0.2 (4) –0.3 (5) 1.0   
Capital account  –0.1 (3)  –0.1 (5) 0.4 (1) 0.7 (0) 0.1 (2)  1.0 
 
For emerging economies there is also a consistent pattern of negative correlation 
between reserves and private flows. In particular, bank and money market flows 
stand out in the country data as always being negatively correlated with official 
reserve flows. There are two possible explanations for this outcome. First, 
domestic monetary authorities may aim to offset the effects of bank and money 
market flows on the overall capital account and the ensuing consequences for the 
exchange rate. Indeed, intervention during the Asian financial crisis was squarely 
aimed at mitigating the sudden reversal of bank and money market flows. Second, 
it is also feasible that since the capital account, current account and the exchange 
rate are jointly determined, actions to maintain a given exchange rate through 
variations in reserves may cause disturbances in the other types of flows within the 
capital account. Such disturbances may manifest themselves in such a way that it is 
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typically the bank and money markets component of the capital account which is 
most accommodating. The scope of this paper is too limited to adequately address 
this interesting aside in the research. 
3.2  Cross-country Correlations 
The correlation in capital flows between countries may also be useful in 
understanding volatility. Several interesting links across countries are evident and 
worth highlighting, although there is no overwhelmingly regular pattern among the 
flows (results not shown). 
There is a negative correlation between total net flows for Japan and those of other 
industrialised economies that are net capital importers, such as Australia and the 
United States. There is less evidence of correlation between the capital accounts of 
industrialised and emerging economies. This is indicative of a relatively high 
degree of financial integration among industrialised economies, while emerging 
economies are less integrated into global financial markets. 
The capital accounts tend to be positively correlated among the emerging 
economies. Given that these balances are also relatively volatile, this result is 
consistent with evidence that these countries are subject to the same balance of 
payments shocks. That is, they tend to experience crises at the same time, which 
also reflects a degree of contagion (Broner and Rigobon 2006). 
Another interesting aspect of the correlations is that they reflect foreign exchange 
intervention that, to varying degrees, attempts to limit currency variations. A priori, 
if reserves are accumulated (a capital outflow) to stem an incipient appreciation of 
the exchange rate (from a capital inflow) and are invested in fixed-income assets, 
this would lead to a negative correlation between reserves in the intervening 
country and portfolio debt inflows for the recipient country, or countries. For both 
Japan and Korea, reserves are significantly negatively correlated with portfolio 
debt flows for the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia. Holding 
reserves in US dollars and investing the proceeds in Treasury securities is common 
to most central banks around the world.  
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4.  Sources of Capital Account Volatility 
This section attempts to explore some of the underlying sources of capital account 
variability using panel data regressions. Broadly speaking there are two types of 
shocks that could affect the capital account flows of a particular country. First, 
investors (for whatever reason) may change their views about the prospects for that 
country as a whole, leading capital to either flow into or out of that country in a 
way that implies a positive correlation of the components of the capital account. 
Second, a shock may be more specific to a particular asset class within a country 
(or across countries), but the extent to which this affects the overall volatility of the 
capital account and the correlations between its various components will depend on 
the degree of substitutability between different asset classes within that country. 
We examine the extent to which factors that may affect the degree of 
substitutability within each country play a role in explaining volatility of the 
overall capital account. Of course, the results will only be suggestive of any 
substitutability effect, since changes in the nature of the country-specific shocks 
may also affect overall capital account volatility. We leave a more detailed 
investigation of this issue to future research. 
4.1  Selection of Explanatory Variables and the Model 
The dependent variable to be explained is the volatility of the overall capital 
account balance (as a share of GDP). Data are annual, and so we measure volatility 
as the standard deviation of quarterly capital account observations within a given 
year. 
The first two explanatory variables we consider correspond to those discussed in 
Section 2, which reflect the importance of foreign direct investment (FDIshare) 
and bank and money market flows (BMMshare) in the capital account. We 
measure the importance of a (net) flow as the ratio of its absolute value to the sum 
of the absolute value of all flows (within each year). 
We also control for the exchange rate regime. If the exchange rate is fixed or 
pegged, the burden of any external adjustment following a shock must fall more on 
quantities rather than prices, which may imply a more volatile capital account. To 
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test for this we include a dummy variable that is ‘zero’ when the exchange rate is 
freely floating or under a managed float, and ‘one’ if the exchange rate regime is 
less flexible (FXregime); see Appendix B for further details. 
We include two variables to capture the potential for a substitutability effect. Both 
are intended to capture the extent of the development or depth of financial markets; 
of course, this in turn is likely to reflect some deeper structural features of the 
various economies. The first variable is a measure of the volume of gross flows. 
Large two-way flows may limit volatility by enhancing the scope of residents to 
meet financing requirements at times when foreigners reverse their investments 
and become sellers.11 The extent of gross flows may also reflect the degree of 
market development. For example, it would be unrealistic to expect portfolio debt 
flows to play a major part in smoothing capital flows in economies that do not have 
well-developed bond markets.12 Furthermore, the extent of gross capital flows 
reflects the degree of capital account openness. The less open the capital account, 
the less scope there is for shocks to one type of flow to be offset by changes in 
other flows. 
To gauge the importance of these factors, we construct a summary measure based 
on gross flows (FlowOpenness). We create an index that depends on the ratio of 
the absolute value of the gross flows to the absolute value of the sum of gross and 



















it flows net flows t nonresiden flows resident
flows t nonresiden flows resident
Openness Flow  (1) 
When capital flows freely in both directions, we expect the sum of absolute gross 
flows to be large relative to net flows. In this case, the index tends towards 100. 
                                           
11  There is some evidence to suggest that industrialised economies are well placed to benefit 
from large overall gross flows, with both residents and non-residents playing sizeable roles in 
the external accounts. In contrast, emerging economies are characterised by being somewhat 
bank dependent and typically have gross flows dominated by the actions of foreigners 
(Lowe 2009). A history of large two-way flows may indicate an increased ability for residents 
to offset volatility caused by foreign investors, in part because it may be associated with 
residents accumulating a larger stock of foreign assets. 
12 Refer also to Debelle and Galati (2005). 
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When capital flows are very one-sided, we expect gross flows to be smaller 
relative to net flows. The most extreme case would be where gross flows are the 
same size as net flows. This would occur if resident or non-resident flows were 
completely restricted. In this case, the value of the index would be zero. To 
illustrate, the United Kingdom has an average openness index score of 90 over the 
period 1980 to 2005, the highest for any economy in our sample reflecting 
London’s role as a global financial centre, while Thailand has an average score of 
only 8, the lowest average score of the countries sampled (see also Appendix C). In 
the panel analysis, the FlowOpenness variable is included contemporaneously and 
with a lag. 
The second variable intended to capture any substitutability effect is a measure of 
the degree of domestic financial market development. This is likely to be an 
important determinant of the ability of investors to substitute between different 
forms of finance. We use the ratio of equity-market turnover to market 
capitalisation as a proxy for financial market development (MarketDevelopment). 
In addition to these variables, we allow for unobserved time-invariant factors to 
influence the volatility of each economy’s capital account by using a fixed-effects 
estimator. 
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 represents the volatility of the capital account as a ratio to GDP 
for country i in year t; ηi is the fixed effect for country i; and εit is the error term. 
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We use a balanced panel of annual data for our 12 countries over the period 1991 
to 2005.13 
4.2  Regression Results 
The results in Table 3 suggest that the composition of the capital account is not a 
significant determinant of its volatility – there is no statistically significant 
relationship between the share of foreign direct investment or bank and money 
market flows and the volatility of the total capital account. The coefficients on 
market development and financial openness (lagged) are negative and statistically 
significant (at the 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively). This is tentative evidence 
in support of the idea that more developed financial markets might encourage 
greater substitutability between different types of flows, thereby helping to reduce 
the volatility of the overall capital account. 
Table 3: Panel Data Estimation Results 
Dependent variable is the volatility of the capital account to GDP 
   Coefficient value  P-value 
Constant  1.97 0.00 
FDIshareit  –1.07 0.24 
BMMshareit  –0.20 0.75 
FlowOpennessit  –1.4 x 10
-3 0.33 
FlowOpennessit-1  –3.5 x 10
-3 0.06 
MarketDevelopmentit  –0.46 0.04 
FXregime  0.15 0.44 
        
R
2 0.64   
Number of observations  180    
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation  0.00   
 
                                           
13  There may be an issue of endogeneity, whereby some of the right-hand-side variables are 
influenced by the same shocks that affect the overall volatility of the capital account. We 
leave this issue for future research and note for now that the results here need to be interpreted 
with this caveat in mind. 
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The coefficient on the exchange rate regime dummy was found to be statistically 
insignificant. However, care should also be taken when interpreting this result. In 
particular, we caution against interpreting this as evidence that fixing the exchange 
rate will not affect capital account volatility. Given that the capital account, current 
account and the exchange rate are jointly determined, it seems probable that fixing 
one of these variables would have some effect on the others. Indeed, when we run 
the above regression using a sub-sample of just the industrialised countries, the 
coefficient on the exchange rate variable is positive and statistically significant. 
5.  Conclusion 
Capital has become increasingly mobile as global financial integration has 
accelerated. Interestingly, while industrialised economies have experienced 
increased volatility in different types of capital flows as financial globalisation 
progressed, there is no evidence to suggest that the capital account has become 
more volatile overall. 
It appears that capital flows exhibit few regular and systematic relationships and 
there is little evidence across our sample of countries to suggest that some flows 
are inherently more conducive to overall stability than others. Hence, the overall 
stability of the capital account among industrialised economies does not appear to 
be due to the inherent properties of different types of capital flows and the mix of 
capital flows underpinning the capital account of these countries. There is tentative 
evidence that these countries meet certain preconditions that allow them to 
integrate into global markets more smoothly.14 
                                           
14 Refer also to Broner and Rigobon (2006), Daude and Fratzscher (2008), Grenville (1998) and 
Nakagawa and Psalida (2007). 
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Appendix A: Predictability of Capital Flows 
In this Appendix we employ some simple econometric techniques to check the 
robustness of the findings discussed in the main part of the paper. 
A.1 Forecasting 
One way of ascertaining whether knowledge of a particular flow conveys 
information useful in making inferences about the overall capital account is to test 
how well it can explain contemporaneous capital account developments. In 
particular, we test whether the fit of a naïve first-order autoregressive (AR(1)) 
model of the capital account can be improved upon by including information about 
specific components of the capital account by estimating the equation 
   (A1)  t
i
t t t flowr kabr kabr          2 1 1 0
where kabrt is the capital account in ratio to GDP in the current period, flowrt
i is 
the contemporaneous value of the ith capital flow as a ratio to GDP, and εt is the 
error term. We run this regression for the baseline AR(1) model, and for each of 
the five key components of the capital account. 
Table A1 reports the main results of these regressions for industrialised and 
emerging economies. The Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) serves as a measure 
of the fit for each model. Results are reported in terms of the ratio of the RMSE of 
the ith model as a ratio to the RMSE of the naïve baseline AR(1) model. A value of 
1 signifies no improvement over the naïve model. A value greater than 1 signals 
deterioration in the ability to predict the capital account, while a value less than 
1  implies an improvement (adjusted for degrees of freedom). In the interest of 
brevity we do not report the ratio for every flow and every country. Instead we 
distinguish between industrialised and emerging economies and average the ratios 
across the six countries in each sample. The second column lists the countries for 




Table A1: Ability to Predict the Capital Account 
Sample 1980–2005, quarterly 
Model  RMSEi/RMSENaïve
Countries for which p-value indicates 
significance at 5 per cent level 
Industrialised economies       
Foreign direct  0.999  – 
Portfolio equity  0.991  Japan, UK 
Portfolio debt  0.991  Japan 
Banks & money markets  0.992  Germany, Sweden 
Reserves  0.994  Australia 
Emerging economies 
Foreign direct  1.001  – 
Portfolio equity  1.004  – 
Portfolio debt  0.990  Mexico 
Banks & money markets  0.922  Korea, Thailand, Mexico, Argentina 
Reserves  0.990  Brazil, Mexico 
   
Notes:  Simple average of results for industrialised and emerging economies. Due to data availability, 
regressions for Korea, Mexico,  Argentina and the Philippines are calculated on samples starting in 
1988:Q1, 1989:Q1, 1992:Q1 and 1996:Q1. All samples end in 2005:Q4. 
 
As expected, all industrialised and emerging economies have highly significant 
coefficients on the lag of the capital account in the naïve model. However, for 
emerging economies the average RMSE for the naïve model is more than twice as 
large as that for industrialised countries (not shown). Introducing information on a 
particular type of flow generally adds less than 2 percentage points of explanatory 
power to the model (adjusted for degrees of freedom) for industrialised economies, 
and less than 2½ percentage points for emerging economies (excluding the bank 
and money market flows), and in many cases there is an outright deterioration in 
explanatory power. 
For industrialised economies, individual flows do not consistently add significant 
explanatory power over and above the naïve AR(1) benchmark. Portfolio equity 
flows are statistically significant for Japan and the United Kingdom, but not for 
other industrialised economies. Portfolio debt flows are only significant for Japan, 
and bank and money market flows only for Germany and Sweden, and in all of 
these cases the fit is only marginally improved. Information on reserve flows 
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markedly improves the fit for Australia, but not for any other industrialised 
economies. 
Emerging economies on the other hand appear to exhibit a more robust relationship 
between bank and money market flows and the capital account, perhaps reflecting 
a degree of bank dependence, as discussed earlier. Bank and money market flows 
improve the fit over the naïve model for Korea, Thailand, Mexico and Argentina. 
However, for the Philippines and Brazil the coefficient on bank and money market 
flows is not statistically significant. Other types of capital also fail to consistently 
improve the fit of the model. In summary, these results suggest that adding 
information about any particular flow is not particularly useful when trying to 
understand and predict capital account developments. 
A.2  Offsetting versus Compounding Relationships 
An additional way to gauge the substitutability of particular flows within the 
capital account is to examine whether a flow tends to move in the same direction as 
the rest of the capital account – compounding the movement of the other flows – or 
if it exhibits an offsetting relationship. To capture these relationships, we regress 









t flowr a a flowr  2 1  (A2) 
where: flowrt
i is the local currency value of the ith capital flow as a ratio to GDP in 
the current period; flowrt
j is the jth capital flow as a ratio to GDP in the current 
period; and εt is the error term. 
A negative coefficient implies an offsetting relationship, while a positive 
coefficient indicates that the flow has a compounding effect on the rest of the 
capital account. For each of the industrialised economies, almost all flows are 
offsetting to some degree, with virtually all coefficients negative and statistically 
significant (Table A2). Bank and money market flows tend to have the strongest 
negative relationship with the rest of the capital account in industrialised 
economies. For the United States, reserve flows do have a positive and statistically 
significant relationship with the rest of the capital account. However, this 
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relationship is economically insignificant compared to all other relationships 
reported in this section. 
Table A2: Offsetting versus Compounding Flows – Industrialised Economies 
Slope coefficients, sample 1980–2005 
Dependent variables  US  Japan  Germany  UK  Australia  Sweden 
Foreign direct 
investment   –0.15**  –0.17** –0.45**  –0.84**  –0.74**  –0.66**  
Portfolio equity 
investment   –0.07*  –0.73** –0.51**  –0.83**  –0.71**  –0.63**  
Portfolio debt 
investment  –0.31**  –0.86** –0.43**  –0.94**  –0.84**  –0.49**  
Bank and money 
markets  –0.19**  –0.92** –0.86**  –0.87**  –0.83**   –0.80**  
Reserves  0.01*  –0.67**  –0.15**  –0.14**  –0.80**   –0.28**  
Notes:  ** and * denote significance at the 5 and 10 per cent levels respectively; quarterly observations. All 
samples end in 2005:Q4. 
 
For emerging economies, almost all coefficients are also negative and statically 
significant. However, the offsetting relationship between particular flows and the 
rest of the capital account is generally less pronounced, particularly for direct 
investment and portfolio equity flows (Table A3). The exception is reserve flows 
which, on average, have a stronger offsetting relationship in the emerging 
economies examined than in the industries economies. Similar to the results for 
industrialised countries, bank and money market flows tend to have a strong 
negative relationship with the rest of the capital account. 
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Table A3: Offsetting and Compounding Flows – Emerging Economies 
Slope coefficients, sample 1980–2005 
Dependent variables  South 
Korea 
Thailand  Philippines  Brazil  Mexico  Argentina 
Foreign direct 
investment   –0.10**  –0.15** –0.15**  –0.16**  –0.17**  –0.24**  
Portfolio equity 
investment   –0.40**  –0.04** –0.10**  –0.14**   0.01  –0.19**  
Portfolio debt 
investment  –0.16**  0.07** –0.37**  –0.59**  –0.54**  –0.38**  
Bank and money 
markets  –0.55**  –1.07** –0.56**  –0.71**   –0.42**   –0.69**  
Reserves  –0.61**  –0.38**  –0.39**   –0.80**  –0.65**   –0.61**  
Notes:  ** and * denote significance at the 5 and 10 per cent levels respectively; quarterly observations. Due to 
data availability, regressions for Korea, Mexico, Argentina and the Philippines are calculated on samples 
starting in 1988:Q1, 1989:Q1, 1992:Q1 and 1996:Q1. All samples end in 2005:Q4. 
 
As emerging economies typically have more volatile capital accounts than 
industrialised economies (see Section 2.1), the results of this section may indicate 
that the degree to which individual flows have offsetting relationships with the rest 
of the capital account is an important factor in determining overall volatility. In 
addition, our results suggest that bank and money market flows may play an 
important role in reducing capital account volatility as they tend to offset the 
combined developments in the remaining flows to a greater degree than any other 
type of flow. 
The relatively strong offsetting relationship between bank and money market flows 
and the rest of the capital account may reflect the fact that banks perform an 
important intermediation function in both industrialised and emerging economies. 
They are typically also active in international debt and foreign exchange markets, 
not only as intermediaries, but also as an important source of arbitrage. Perhaps it 
is this function which allows bank and money market flows to readily adjust and 
offset developments in other flows. 
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Appendix B: Data 
Table B1: Data Definitions and Sources 
Variable  Definition, notes and sources  
Capital account 
(US dollars) 
Set equal to the current account, consistent with the balance of 
payments identity. Source: International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) 
International Financial Statistics 
Capital flows 
(US dollars) 
Gross and net flows.  Source: IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics 
Capital account and 
capital flows  
(local currency) 
Quarterly US-dollar-denominated capital account and capital flows 
data are converted into local currency terms using quarter-average 
exchange rates 
Exchange rates  Quarter-average local currency to US dollar exchange rates. Sources: 
Euro/USD – Bloomberg; authors’ calculations; All other exchange 
rates – IMF’s International Financial Statistics (the December 
quarter 1985 Brazilian Real/USD exchange rate is estimated by the 
authors based on IMF data). 
Exchange rate regime 
(FXregimeit) 
The classification of each country’s exchange rate is taken from the 
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions, 2006. De facto exchange rate regime classifications are 
used. 
Importance of a particular 
flows within the capital 
account (FDIshare and 
BMMshare) 
Annual from quarterly data; sum of the absolute value of the 
particular flows in a given year, divided by the sum of the absolute 
value of all flows in that same year. 
 
MarketDevelopmentit  Share market turnover; total value of shares traded to average real 
market capitalisation. Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 
(2000) 
Nominal GDP 
(local currency)  
 
Quarterly; seasonally adjusted; data for Korea, the Philippines, and 
Thailand are seasonally adjusted by the authors. Sources: Australia 
(1980–2005) – Australian Bureau of Statistics; South Korea  
(1980–2005), Philippines (1980–2005) and Thailand (1993–2005) – 
CEIC; Argentina (1993–2005), Brazil (1991–2005), Japan  
(1980–2005), Mexico (1980–2005), Sweden (1980–2005), United 
Kingdom (1980–2005) and United States (1980–2005) – Thomson 
Reuters; Germany (1980–2005) – Thomson Reuters and authors’ 
calculations (data pre-1991 are spliced using West German nominal 
GDP growth rates); Argentina (1980–1992), Brazil (1980–1990) and 
Thailand (1980–1992) – IMF’s International Financial Statistics, 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) database, and authors’ estimates 
(annual US dollar current prices GDP from the WEO database is 
linearly interpolated to create a quarterly profile that is then 
converted into local currency terms using quarter-average exchange 
rates).  
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Appendix C: Gross Capital Flow Openness 
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